Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi

As military power will continue to be assigned a high premium, the US will be the leading actor in global affairs. However, many states will openly question American unilateralism

The statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdous square Baghdad was brought down on April 9, 2003. It was a moment of triumph for the United States. The US has demonstrated that it has enough military power and political determination to pursue its global agenda in the face of widespread diplomatic opposition.

The Iraq episode may convince the US administration to work towards restructuring the Middle Eastern political arrangements to protect and promote its interests. This will include strengthening the pro-US regimes and pressurising the regimes that are perceived to threaten its political agenda and interests.

Can a militarily powerful state successfully pursue its global agenda only on the basis of military preponderance? Is diplomatic support relevant for such an agenda? Can a state continue to ignore political rationale and good will for extending its dominance?

Military is an important instrument of power. However, no state can sustain its preponderant role in world affairs by relying solely on military power. A military achievement cannot become viable without sufficient diplomatic backup to ensure its acceptance and endurance in the international community. Other instruments of power — diplomatic and political, economic, and technological transfers — also have to be mobilised for an effective role at the global level.

Another issue pertains to the divergence between the US and two important European Union (EU) states and Russia and its impact on the international system. How far will these differences crystallise into two competing poles in global politics? Is the international system headed towards a multipolar system?

The US military action in Iraq faced strong opposition from France, Russia, Germany and China. These countries did not support the use of military power against Iraq. This perspective was widely shared by a large number of developing countries. This is the first instance in the post-Cold War period that major European states and Russia diverged so sharply from the US. The leaders of France, Germany and Russia, who met in St. Petersburg on April 11-12 insisted that the UN should be actively involved in the management of post-Saddam Iraq.

One interpretation of these differences is that a new “pole” is emerging in global politics will challenge the dominant position of the US in world affairs. The international system will become bi or multipolar with Russia, China and the two major states of Europe coordinating their policies to restrain the US. This new “pole” will enjoy the moral backing of the international public opinion that was reflected in the anti-war protests in several countries, including the US and the UK. A large number of other states that have strong reservations about the US decision to use military power in Iraq will flock around this “pole”. The emergence of such a collective political entity will reassert the centrality of diplomacy and pacific means for settlement of disputes. It will make the international system more participatory and assign greater importance to the UN.

France, Germany, Russia, and China will continue to disagree with the US vis-à-vis post-Saddam Iraq and insist on greater involvement of the UN. They will definitely be a restraining influence on the US in the future. The divergence on Iraq can spill over to other issue areas. These states may question the preponderant US role in the economic, political and cultural domains. US unilateralism will be moderated because the power will find it increasingly difficult to dictate a global political agenda.

These differences are expected to persist. But we are not likely to witness a Cold War like level of confrontation between the US and the states that diverge on the Iraq issue. The two sides do not represent competing political ideologies and are not engaged in a race for expanding their influence in the world at each other’s cost. Watertight blocs are not likely to emerge because the US and the European states advocate liberal democracy and free economy and agree on issues like European security, transnational terrorism and expanded interaction with the rest of the world.

They differ on strategies dealing with security issues. France, Germany and Russia opposed the US decision to use military power against the Saddam regime in Iraq, although they shared the goal of disarming his regime. The two sides are going to review their relations in the near future and partly compose their difference because the intensification of the present divergence does not serve their interests. They are expected to show some flexibility towards each other because security, political and economic considerations do not warrant widening differences. The US, France, and Germany need each other for management of European security, NATO and a host of other global issues.

Similarly, Russia’s on-going efforts to improve its economy do not warrant the accentuation of these differences with the US. Russia relies on economic assistance from international financial institutions and seeks US cooperation for a host of economic and social development programmes, including US financial and technological support for securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal and installations. They are also working on new arrangements for arms reduction which may be jeopardised if they do not show some restraint towards each other.

China also expressed strong reservations about the use of military power against Iraq. It endorsed the political stand adopted by France, Germany and Russia. However, it adopted a low profile while opposing US unilateralism and pre-emptive action. The new leadership in China and the imperatives of China’s priority for economic and technological development make it necessary to keep differences with the US within manageable limits.

The UK is expected to act as a bridge between the US and the two major European states because its leadership is more sensitive to European opinion and reaction of the rest of the world than the US. The enlargement of the EU next year with the admission of ten members will change the organisation’s complexion. Most new members want good relations with the US. If Germany and France do not moderate their position, EU’s internal harmony will suffer. The pro-US disposition of the new EU members will also facilitate Tony Blair’s reconciliation efforts.

The differences between the US on the one hand and the major EU states, Russia and China on the other may not lead to perpetual confrontation. The two sides will show some accommodation towards each other in the near future. However, these differences will not disappear altogether. The states that disagree with the US on Iraq will continue to apply diplomatic pressure to moderate the international conduct of the US. Their diplomatic pressure will vary from issue to issue. They may cooperate on some matters and disagree on others. The international system will see hard bargaining amongst the major actors who simultaneously disagree and cooperate. The international system would not reflect the bipolar features of the early or mid-period of the Cold War era nor would it become truly multipolar is it was the 1980s.

As military power will continue to be assigned a high premium, the US will be the leading actor in global affairs. However, many states will openly question American unilateralism. The US would find it difficult to pursue its agenda by relying solely on military power. The international system may still be unipolar in military terms but the US will engage in active diplomacy with several powerful states or their conglomerates for pursuing its goals. Diplomacy, goodwill, and the UN will make a come back. This will dilute the role and status of the sole superpower and the world order may acquire some features of multipolarity but it may not necessarily become a multipolar.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst